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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case came up for hearing upon stipulated facts 
which are on file in this action: 
1. That on July 12, 1950, an automobile owned by 
Mark Nasfell and registered in his name was permitted to 
remain in a space upon 24th Street in Ogden City, Weber 
County, State of Utah, such street being part of State High-
way 1189, within a parking meter zone, adjacent to which 
parking meter 11157 was established. 
2. That said vehicle was permitted to remain in said 
space at a time when said meter 11157 displayed a signal 
indicating that said space was illegally in use, between 
the hours of 9:00 o'clock a.m. and 8:00 o'clock p.m. on 
said day of July 12, 1950. 
3. That at said time and place, and when said park·. 
ing meter was so displaying the signal indicating that the 
space was illegally in use, a police officer of Ogden City 
placed upon the windshield Qf said vehicle a notice of 
violation. 
4. That thereafter, and on the 19th day of August, 
1950, Ogden City caused a complaint to be issued and 
filed with the Clerk of the Court of Ogden City, and after 
the filing of said complaint, caused a summons to be 
issued. 
5. That said summons ordered the appellant Mark 
Nasfell, to appear in the City Court of Ogden City on 
August 25, 1950, to answer the charges in the complaint 
theretofore filed. That said summons was served upon 
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said appellant, Mark Nasfell, on the 22nd day of August, 
1950. 
6. That on the 25th day of August, 1950, as afore-
said, appellant entered his general appearance by his at-
torney, Hufh E. Dobbs, Esq., of the law firm of Dobbs 
and Dobbs, who appear as appellant's counsel in connec-
tion with this action, and by said attorney entered a plea 
of nnot fU i l ty" to said complaint. 
7. That thereafter, and on the 7th day of November, 
1950, such time being prior to any decision being render-
ed by the said City Court of Ogden City, appellant filed 
this action for declaratory judgment, in the Second District 
Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah. 
8. That thereafter, and on the 20th day of November, 
1950, the said District Court, upon motion of the respond-
ent, for dismissal of the said action, rendered its order 
dismissing the said action on the grounds that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim against the respondent upon 
which relief might be granted, and that it is from such 
order that the appellant now appeals to this Court. 
9. The action of respondent is based on the follow-
ing Ordinances or part thereof as follows: 
a. Ordinance 1H54: The General Parking 
Meter Ordinance. 
cc2. He shall attach to such vehicle a notice 
that it has been parked in violation of this ordi-
nance and instructing the owner or operator to 
report at the Desk Sergeant's office at the Police 
Department of the City of Ogden in regard to 
such violation. Each such owner or operator 
may, within twenty-four (24) hours after the time 
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when such notice was attached to such vehicle, 
pay to the Desk Sergeant or other officer in 
charge at his office, in full satisfaction of such 
violation the sum of fifty cents ($ . 50) which 
shall be remitted by the Chief of Police to the 
city treasurer. 
''(k) Any person who shall violate any of the 
provisions of this ordinance and any person who 
aids, abets or assists therein, shall, upon con-
viction thereof, be subject to a fine of any 
amount not exceeding Fifty Dollars ($50.) for 
each offense or violation or be imprisoned in 
the city jail for a term not exceeding one hundred 
days, or both. A judgment that a fine be paid 
for a violation of this ordinance shall provide 
that the person against whom it is directed shall 
in default of its payment serve one day in the 
city jail for each $2.00 of the fine." 
b. Ordinance 11543: An ordinance declaring 
certain facts to be prima facie evidence of guilt 
in connection with parking meter violations: 
''An Ordinance of Ogden City amending Section 
27G67 of the Revised Ordinances of Ogden City 
Utah, 1933, relating to the responsibility of 
owners of vehicles found illegally parked. 
''Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners 
of Ogden City, Utah: 
Section I. Section 27G67, Revised Ordinances 
of Ogden City, Utah, 1933, is amended to read 
as follows: 
Section 27G67. Owner prima-facie responsible 
for illegal parking. The presence of vehicle in 
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or upon any public street or highway in Ogden 
City stopped, standing or parking in violation of 
any ordinance of Ogden City, shall be prima-facie 
evidence that the person in whose name such 
vehicle is registered as owner committed or 
authorized the commission of such violation. 
Section 2. In the opinion of the Board of Com-
missioners of Ogden City a public emergency ex-
ists with respect to the matter contained, and it 
is necessary for the immediate peace, health and 
preservation of the safety of Ogden City that this 
ordinance shall take effect upon its adoption and 
publication. 
Section 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon 
its adoption and publication. 
Passed and adopted and ordered published by the 
Board of Commissioners of Ogden City this 1st 
day of March, 1950. 
Attest: 
Elizabeth M. Tillotson, 
City Recorder 
Publish March 2, 1950." 
R. H. White, Mayor 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That Ogden City has neither an express or im-
plied power to enact any ordinance which purports to de-
termine what quantum of evidence shall be sufficient to 
warrant the conviction of a person charged with an offense 
against its ordinances. 
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2. That the presumption, which such ordinance 6343 
attempts to give the effect of evidence in such cause, 
bears no such reasonable relationship to the question of 
guilt of one charged with a breach of such ordinance by 
illegal parking of a motor vehicle, as to raise any pre-
sumption of guilt in fact; and such ordinance in such re-
spect is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the po-
lice powers granted, with respect to control of public 
streets and traffic thereon, to said Ogden City, and there-
fore unconstitutional. 
3. That such ordinance, attempting to define the 
quantum of evidence requisite to convict in a case arising 
thereunder, upon a charge of unlawful parking in a re-
stricted zone of said city, is an encroachment upon the 
functions of the judiciary, and the state of legislature. 
4. That the city has never received the authority 
from the State Road Commission to place parking meters 
upon Washington Boulevard and 24th Street in said city. 
such streets being part of State Highways 89 and 87. 
5. Appellant was not given due notice of any action 
contemplated by the city until such time as he received a 
summons issued by the city, and the practice of the city 
in merely placing upon the windshield of a vehicle a, pur-
ported notice of violation is not sufficient notice, under 
the laws of this state, to vest jurisdiction upon the city 
court, nor to give the appellant notice that he should pay 
a certain fine, and that in case he does not pay such fine 
upon such notice he will be fined in a sum ten times the 
amount that would have been assessed if he had received 
the said ticket. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF OGDEN 
CITY TO PASS SUCH ORDINANCE 11343. 
It is general law in this nation that the city has only 
those powers as are given them directly by the consti-
tution or statute or such powers as may be reasonably im-
plied as being necessary in the enforcement of such 
powers. This has been so held in literally scores of 
cases, and it would be a waste of the court's time to cite 
all such cases. A few on this point are: 
(0 ~Bohn v. Salt Lake City-79 U 121; 8 P 2nd 591; ( 
81 A. L. R. 215. 
Neldon v. Clark - 20 U 382, 59 P 524; 
Orden City v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & 
Irrir. Co., 16 U 440; 52 P 697 41 L. R. A. 305; 
\ City of Price v. Jaynes, et al. - 191 P(2) 606; ---1 ~Salt Lake City v. Bennion, 15 P (2) 648; 
· -1 in-tftr Rapid Transit Co. v. Orden City- 58 P (2) 1 
---e-American Petroleum Co. v. Orden City, - 62 P(2) 
557; 
~- _Walton v. Tracey Loan & Trust Co. -92 P (2) 724; 
_ J./ -V'l, Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P (2) 671 · 
f Wadsworth v. Santaquin City - 28 P (2) 161; 
---1? American Fork City v. Robinson - 292 P. 249; 
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 P 234;--
2. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern - 150 P (2) 773; 
-!---Salt Lake City v. Revene, - 124 P (2) 537;-
1·-TtJoele City v. Elkinrton, 116 P (2) 406 
All such cases cited being cases decided by this 
court as to the powers of the cities and all such cases 
limiting the cities as above set forth. 
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In this state the power of cities to regulate parking 
1s found in Title 57, Chapter 7, Section 85, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, and provides as follows: 
"(a) The provisions of this act are intended to 
confer upon local authorities the right of, and 
shall not be deemed to deprive said authorities 
of existing powers with respect to streets and 
highways under their jurisdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise of the police power; " 
"( 1) Regulating the standing or parking of vehi-
cles including the requirement for payment of a 
parking fee which fee may vary in order to relieve 
traffic congestion in designated areas. " 
This is the only place under the Codes of this state 
where the power to regulate parking by the city is found, 
and it is beyond the perspective powers of counsel to see 
where such a statute in the least implies a power to the 
city to pass ordinances setting out the quantum of evi-
dence which shall be sufficient to warrant the conviction 
of a person charged of an offense under an ordinance 
passed under the authority of the above quoted statute. 
Nor can counsel find any other statute in the Codes 
of this state, including the powers of police granted to 
the cities, where an implication might be drawn granting 
the city power to pass such an ordinance. The Courts of 
this state are created by the constitution and by statutes 
passed by the state legislature, and cities are not given 
power of any sort over such courts, not even to the slight-
est degree, either expressly or impliedly • 
. 
In point with this argument and by way of comparison 
consider the prima facie ordinance as concerns drunken 
driving. The city of Ogden has been given the power to 
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pass ordinances making it a misdemeanor to drive while 
drunk, but before they presumed to pass an ordinance de-
termining that a certai ~t alcoholic content in the blood of 
a person arrested for drunken driving was prima facie evi-
dence of such drunken driving they waited for the state 
to pass such a statute. Now it is admitted that where the 
state has acted on matters such as this, the city may act, 
within certain limits, but in the case before us· the state 
has failed to enact any law placing responsibility upon 
the owner of an automobile under most circumstances. 
Therefore it is felt by counsel that until the state legis-
lature acts placing the responsibility contained in this 
ordinance upon the owner of an automobile that the city 
does not have the power, express or implied, to pass such 
an ordinance as this. 
It is therefore felt by counsel that the district court 
erred in sustaining the respondent's motion as against 
this part of the appellant's complaint in holding that the 
city had the power to pass such an ordioance. 
POINT II. 
THAT SUCH ORDINANCE 11343 IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN 
THAT IT DENIES HIM CERTAIN PRIVILEGES GRANT-
ED HIM UNDER SUCH CONSTITUTIONS. 
All defendants in criminal actions have two rights 
which since the conception of Anglo-Saxon Law have 
been granted him, these rights being: (1) the right to be 
considered innocent of the crime with which he is charged 
until it has been proven that he is guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt; and (2) that no law shall be passed which 
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would require a defendant to take the witness stand on 
his own behalf against his will. It is the contention of 
counsel that both of these rights have been derogated by 
ordinance *343. 
In what way are these basic rights violated by this 
ordinance? To determine this the ordinances must be 
analyzed. This ordinance says that the mere fact of 
ownership, and that fact alone, is enough without further 
evidence on the part of the city attorney to set up a prima 
facie presumption of guilt, in other words, the defendant 
is guilty before he is proven so beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The only method in which the defendant can combat this 
presumption is by taking the stand in his own behalf, and 
stating unequivocally that he did not so place the car in 
the parking stand. Now it is common knowledge, and 
therefore a matter of which this court could take judicial 
knowledge, that no family man drives his automobile at 
all times, in fact the matter is that in the majority of the 
cases his wife or child drive it most of the time. Even 
in the case of a single man there are many times in which 
the car is driven by mechanics of the garage in which he 
left it or by some friend. Now under these circumstances 
can an owner of a vehicle state unequivocally, tel did not 
place the vehicle in that parking stall"? The time in this 
case must be considered. One month elapsed between the 
time in which the records of the city show that a ticket 
was placed upon the windshield of the appellant's auto· 
mobile and the time in which he received a notice inform· 
ing him of the fact. No man keeps a record which shows 
that he drove the automobile on this day, that his wife 
drove it on this day, little Johnnie drove it that day, and 
this day it was in the garage being repaired. If this burden 
10 
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was placed upon him part of the convenience of his owner-
ship of the automobile would be denied him. Yet under 
this ordinance can he be put in jeopardy of committing 
perjury by stating that he did not so park the automobile 
when in fact he did hut did not remember doing so. Most 
persons who possess automobiles are responsible citizens 
of a community, and would rather pay the fine in con-
nection with this law, no matter how unjust it may be, 
than to take a chance on committing perjury. Now this 
might be different if there were some assurance that he, 
or the person who parked the automobile, as the case may 
be, received the notice of violation therefore placing the 
incident in his mind, but as will be discussed under Point 
115 there is no assurance that the said notice is received. 
It is obvious that the district court erred in upholding 
this ordinance as constitutional. Here we have two sub-
stantive and vested rights being denied, by the promul-
gation of a clearly unreasonable and arbitrary ordinance. 
An ordinance that says to the defendant, you are guilty 
and will be considered so until you present the proof 
which will make it appear that you are innocent, and the 
only method in which you have of proving yourself inno-
cent is to take the witness stand and make an unequivo-
cal statement that you did not park the car in the parking 
meter stall as you are charged with doing. What would be 
the position of a defendant on the stand? Could he over-
come the presumption of guilt by stating, nl don't be-
lieve I parked the car there", or nto the best of my knowl-
edge I did not park the car there." No, I believe not. 
His only method is to say ni did not park the car there." 
As pointed out above in this brief a statement of that 
sort, considering the passing of time and the lack of 
11 
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notice which would fix the date, time and circumstances 
in the defendant's mind, would put him at a great risk of 
committing perjury even though he did .not believe that he 
parked the car there. It is felt by counsel, that unless 
further protection than is given by this ordinance, is 
given the defendants substantive rights are being abused, 
and even destroyed. 
This court in the case of State v. Potello ( 119 P. 
1023, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of 
Simkins v. State, 249 P 168, have discussed what must 
be found in a prima facie statute to take it out of the 
range of the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the 
police power of the state. Because of the limited power 
of cities, discussed under Point I, the limits stated in 
those cases are A fortiori when applied to municipal 
ordinances. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE CITY IS ENCROACHING UPON THE 
FUNCTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY, AND THE STATE 
LEGISLATURE. 
In the case of State v. Pote ll o, (supra) this court 
held: "Should the Legislature declare, that, on mere 
proof of a larceny and recent possession, in the accused, 
and nothing more, a jury is required, or bound, to convict, 
though it may not, on such evidence adduced, be con· 
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, 
such legislation would be an encroachment upon the per· 
ogatives of the judici~ry." The Court then goes on to 
point out that, with the additional requirement that the 
defendant must have given some unsatisfactory account 
12 
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of how he came into possession of the property -- must 
have lied about it in other words -- the defect is cured, 
since to have stolen property in his possession, and to 
tell some farfetched tale, which lacks indicia of truth 
when asked to account for his possession, does create 
a state of evidence upon which reasonable men might 
conclude that the defendant was guilty. 
Ogden City's ordinance stops just where the legis-
lation, assumed in the language of the court in the 
Pote llo case, stopped. It makes the mere ownership of 
the car, and proof that the car was illegally parked by 
someone, proof of the guilt of the owner. This clearly 
then is an attempt by the city to impose upon the courts 
pf this state a substantive rule of evidence, which the 
state legislature, even with its much broader powers, 
could not do under the language of the above quoted case, 
without imposing upon the functions of the judiciary. 
Even if this ordinance met the requirements of the 
Pote llo case the city would not, under its limited powers, 
be entitled to pass such a law. If this ordinance was 
merely a procedural rule, and not substantive, as counsel 
contends that it is, the city's attempt to pass such a rule 
must fail. The Courts of this state are constituted by 
the Constitution and by State Statute. In no place in the 
Codes of this state is the power given to any city to 
make rules concerning the courts. That power has been 
found in many cases to be either in the Supreme Court of 
the state or in the legislature. Though there is a conflict 
as to which of the above branches has the power, there 
is no conflict with fact that the city, unless such power 
is given expressly or impliedly by statute, does not have 
13 
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I 
any such power. It would seem that in the state of Utah 
the Legislature has recognized the power of the Supreme 
Court to make such rules by their enactment of Title 20, 
Chapter 2, Section 410, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
Therefore removing from the legislature the power to pass 
procedural rules. 
There is no doubt, if all requirements are met, that 
the state legislature would have power to pass such a 
substantive rule of evidence and thereby bind all the 
Courts of this state by such a statute, but in this ordi· 
nance we have an attempt by the City of Ogden to take 
over the functions of the state legislature. It has been 
stated before that in no place in the Codes of this state 
have the cities of this state been granted any control over 
the functioning of the courts, therefore, this ordinance 
amounts to the fact that the city of Ogden has assumed a 
power which has not been delegated to it. It must also be 
stated that in any case arising in the City Court where an 
appeal is taken from the judgment of such court to the 
district court, the case being there tried De Novo, this 
ordinance to be effective must be able to bind the district 
court, and in an extreme case the Supreme Court. There· 
fore we have an attempt by a body of government, which 
is low on the scale of the legislative and administrative 
branches of the government, a body constituted of merely 
delegate powers, to dictate to a branch of government, 
the judicial branch, a branch of which it is not even a 
member. 
The district court by its order, for which this appeal 
is taken, impliedly held that the city of Ogden has the 
right to pass an ordinance which will bind all the courts 
of this state to a substantive rule of evidence, and also 
14 
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that it was within the power of the city to pass an ordi-
nance setting forth this matter of substantive law. 
This was clearly error on the part of the court as set 
forth in the argument. It is clear that the city cannot, 
under its limited powers, control the evidence, nor set 
forth what shall be evidence in the courts of this state, 
and it is clear also that where the state has not acted 
specifically the city cannot act unless it can be found 
that the city, under some of its stated powers, has the di-
rect or implied power to pass such an ordinance. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE CITY HAS NEVER RECEIVED AU-
THORITY FROM THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION TO 
PLACE PARKING METERS UPON STATE HIGHWAYS 
WITHIN ITS BORDERS. 
Title 57, Chapter 7, Section 84, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, states that uNo local authority shall enact 
or enforce any· rule or regulation in conflict with the pro-
visions of the Motor Vehicle Act unless expressly author-
ized by such act". Section 88 (b) of the same Title and 
Chapter states, ''no local authority shall place or main-
tain any traffic control device upon any highway under the 
jurisdiction of the State Road Commission except by the 
latter's permission." Washington Boulevard and 24th 
Street, located in Ogden City, are state highways under 
the jurisdiction of the State Road Commission. As a 
matter of judicial notice it should be recognized by the 
court that the City of Ogden has failed to receive such 
permission from the State Road Commission. 
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POINT V. 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF, IN THIS ACTION, WAS. 
NOT GIVEN DUE NOTICE OF ANY ACTION CONTEM-
PLATED BY THE CITY. 
This point goes to the city court's jurisdiction. By 
the stipulated facts in this case it will be found that the 
only notice which the appellant herein received, prior to 
service of summons upon him, was a so-called "ticket" 
placed upon the windshield of his automobile. It is felt 
by counsel herein that such a method is insufficient to 
give the owner of an automobile notice of any action being 
contemplated against him. Let us examine the procedure 
here. If a person receives the so-called ccticket" and 
pays his fine at that time the fine is $ .50, but if he does 
not receive the so-called "ticket" and the city serves a 
summons and complaint upon him the fine is then $5, or 
a sum ten times as great. There are only three methods 
of service of summons in this state, either by personal 
service, by substituted service upon a p~rson at the resi-
dence or office of the defendant other than the defendant 
himself, and service by publication. It is beyond the 
powers of counsel to see under which category of service 
this method of placing a ticket upon an empty automobile 
will fall. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the above points it must be concluded that: 
( 1) the City does not have the express or implied 
powers to pass such an ordinance under the police power; 
(2) the ordinance has the effect of removing certain 
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protections given a defendant by the Anglo-Saxon Law, 
the Constitution of the United States, and the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah; and 
(3) such an ordinance is an encroachment by a body 
of government, which has only delegated powers, upon the 
functions of the judicial and legislative branches of the 
government. 
(4) that the city has received no authority to place 
parking meters upon public highways, and 
(5) chat the method used by the city in giving notice 
of a violation is not sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the 
City Court. 
This court is therefore called upon to determine that 
the district court erred in sustaining the motion of the 
respondent as to all of the points above set out. 
Appellant's Address: 
Mark Nasfell 
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